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Foreword 
 
 
This report and analysis by the Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies at Teesside 
University is warmly welcome. It is an independent academic review of the work and data that has 
come out from the Tell MAMA project which is organised by Faith Matters. For over a decade, work 
with Muslim communities through Faith Matters has consistently led to statements and comments 
being made by members of these communities to project officers, about how they have suffered anti-
Muslim prejudice. Many have stated that they have suffered repeat incidents and a national 
programme looking at this under-researched area of work was needed. This is what the Tell MAMA 
project attempts to do. More importantly, it also supports victims of anti-Muslim prejudice so that they 
can be signposted, casework undertaken and links with police forces made for possible prosecutions. 
 
We are proud for the Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies to analyse and review 
the evidential material from Tell MAMA and which primarily looks at the period of 2012 and early 
2013. The Centre’s experience on the far right was needed given that some material that Tell MAMA 
received and collated was directly related to far-right sympathisers and their targeting of Muslims, 
both online and offline. This is the first detailed evidential report on anti-Muslim prejudice and builds 
the foundation for this area of work. It also reflects a disturbing picture of anti-Muslim prejudice within 
the first year of operations of Tell MAMA. We are therefore proud to present this work in partnership 
with the Centre and with their academic independence maintained. This is essential given that there 
are social commentators who still believe that anti-Muslim prejudice is not real. This report which is 
based on hard, tangible data, we hope, should help to develop further work in this area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiyaz Mughal OBE FCMI FRSA. 
Founder and Director of Faith Matters.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1  The ‘Tell MAMA’ (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) project was set up in 2012 by the inter-faith 
organisation, Faith Matters.
1
 It was launched by Rt. Hon Eric Pickles MP, Secretary of State for the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) on 21 February 2012. The project, 
modelled on the work of the Community Security Trust (CST),
2
 which monitors anti-Semitic incidents 
on behalf of Britain’s Jewish community, allows people across England and Wales to record any 
attack that they have experienced as a consequence of their Muslim faith (or from someone 
perceiving them to be Muslim). The Tell MAMA service enables victims to report the details of the 
abuse that they have suffered, whether street-based or online. It is the first national project of its kind 
to specifically record anti-Muslim hate crime whilst also offering support to victims of anti-Muslim 
prejudice.  
1.2  To raise awareness of this service amongst Muslim communities, Faith Matters, with funding 
from the DCLG, employed six regional officers in England and Wales who conducted extensive 
outreach activities into community centres, civil society organisations, mosques, and youth centres. 
This was combined with promotional campaigns on the Islam TV Channel, various community-
focused advice and information sessions in Town Halls across England and Wales, a dedicated 
website, active Twitter and Facebook accounts, and joint partnerships with local police forces, local 
authorities, and with national civil society organisations like Victim Support, Neighbourhood Watch, 
and Citizens Advice Bureaux.  
1.3 Victims can either use a free phone number to report incidents, or they can report through 
more high-tech channels, such as email, SMS text, Twitter, Facebook messaging, or through the Tell 
MAMA website. Information is collated into a special bespoke database that was developed by Tell 
MAMA. Trained caseworkers then verify whether the reported incident was anti-Muslim in nature.
3
  
1.4  Like the CST, Tell MAMA functions as a third party reporting centre. It passes on information 
directly to police forces through the ‘True Vision’ reporting system, set up by the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) to combat and report hate crimes. ‘True Vision’ provides a single reporting 
facility to all police forces, through a dedicated server hosted by the Metropolitan police.  
1.5 Due to the fundamentally self-selecting nature of the Tell MAMA data, no definitive claims can 
be made as to the overall prevalence of anti-Muslim attacks in England and Wales. In any case such 
                                            
1
 Faith Matters, Tell MAMA’s parent organisation, undertakes work on inter-faith integration, conflict 
resolution, and extremism prevention in Britain, Pakistan and the Middle East.  
2
 The Community Security Trust (CST) has been compiling reports of anti-Semitic incidents since 
1984. The CST publishes an annual report of cases. The CST also supports victims and provides 
communal defence for synagogues and Jewish schools.  
3
 During 2012, 50 plus cases at this stage were not marked as anti-Muslim since there was little 
corroborating evidence. 
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attacks continue to be under-reported (see below). Nonetheless, the Tell MAMA data paints a 
troubling picture of low-level anti-Muslim harassment: incidents in the workplace, in the street, 
between neighbours and particularly online, which may not always hit the headlines but can still have 
an emotionally distressing, and in some cases devastating, effect on people’s lives and their 
communities.
4
   
1.6 The recently-launched Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies at Teesside 
University has been working with Faith Matters in the delivery of the Tell MAMA project. One outcome 
of this relationship is an independent quantifiable overview of the nature of anti-Muslim attacks, as 
well as, where possible, the background and affiliations of alleged perpetrators. While the Tell MAMA 
project is a new initiative and is invariably subject to teething problems,
5
 the following report aims to 
highlight key features of the Tell MAMA dataset as they pertain to far right participation in anti-Muslim 
attacks - both offline and online. 
 
2. Aims of the Report 
2.1. The aims of this report are as follows: 
 To analyse the Tell MAMA dataset, covering the period 1 April 2012 - 30 April 2013 inclusive, 
in order to provide a quantifiable overview of perpetrator profile, attack type, and location 
occurrence; 
 To examine the under-studied relationship between anti-Muslim hate crime and the far right. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
4
 Evidence suggests that hate crime impacts on wellbeing to a greater extent than non-hate crime. 
According to the British Crime Survey data for 2009/10 and 2010/11, 67% of hate crime victims 
experience anger; 50% annoyance; 40% shock; 35% loss of confidence/vulnerability; 39% fear; 23% 
anxiety; 20% depression; and 17% record difficulty sleeping. See Kevin Smith (ed.), Deborah Lader, 
Jacqueline Hoare and Ivy Lau, Home Office Statistical Bulletin, ‘Hate Crime, cyber-security and the 
experience of crime among children’, Supplementary volume 3 to Crime in England and Wales 
2010/11, Home Office: March 2012, p. 22.  
 
5
 The Tell MAMA project has recently come under criticism fromTelegraph journalist Andrew Gilligan, 
see for example, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10093568/The-truth-
about-the-wave-of-attacks-on-Muslims-after-Woolwich-murder.html; 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/10108098/Muslim-hate-monitor-to-lose-
backing.html. For a response by Fiyaz Mughal, Director of Faith Matters, see 
http://tellmamauk.org/gilligan-the-reductionists/ and http://tellmamauk.org/gilligan-at-it-again-attack-
the-vehicle-not-the-data-is-now-the-strategy/. For further commentary, see Matthew Feldman,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-matthew-feldman/edl-columnists-are-legitimising_b_3472599.html. 
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3. Anti-Muslim Hate Crime 
3.1. In the first place, it should be noted that ‘hate crime’ remains a ‘somewhat slippery notion’.
6
 
Definitions of ‘hate crime’ vary from one country to the next, and even within countries (the United 
States, for example). In Britain the central point of reference - for practitioners at least - is the 
operational definition offered by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), a definition which is 
also shared by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): 
Hate crime is any criminal offence committed against a person or property that is motivated 
by hostility towards someone based on their disability, race, religion, gender identity or sexual 
orientation. 
Hate crime can take many forms including: 
 physical attacks such as physical assault, damage to property, offensive graffiti and arson; 
 threat of attack including offensive letters, abusive or obscene telephone calls, groups 
hanging around to intimidate, and unfounded, malicious complaints; 
 verbal abuse, insults or harassment - taunting, offensive leaflets and posters, abusive 
gestures, dumping of rubbish outside homes or through letterboxes, and bullying at school or 
in the workplace.
7
 
3.2 According to this ‘official’ definition, anti-Muslim hate crime constitutes a form of religious hate 
crime. Anti-Muslim hate crime should be understood, therefore, as any criminal offence which is 
perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based upon a 
person's religion or perceived religion, that is, their Muslim faith.  
3.3 This can be distinguished from ‘race hate’ crime, which should be understood as any criminal 
offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice 
based upon a person's ‘race’ or perceived ‘race’. A persistent difficulty, of course, is that such neat 
distinctions often break down in the real world. Anti-Muslim hate crime can be motivated, as one study 
has noted, by political fears about Muslims as a security or terrorist threat (rather than a fear about 
Islam per se),
8
 and/or it might be motivated by racism (active discrimination against South Asians in 
particular as people associated with Islam). In reality, the distinction between race hate crime and 
religious hate crime can often become blurred, making conceptual and reporting clarity difficult. 
                                            
6
 See Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland, Hate Crime: Impact, Causes, and Responses (London: 
Sage, 2009), p. 7. 
7
 See http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/fact_sheets/hate_crime/ 
8
 See Jonathan Githens-Mazier and Robert Lambert, Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: a 
London Case Study (University of Exeter: European Muslim Research Centre, 2010), p. 17.  
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4. Official Statistics: the Scope of the Problem   
4.1 Since 2008 police forces have been recording, and collating data on the following five strands 
of hate crime: 
 Race 
 Faith and Religion 
 Sexual Orientation 
 Transgender 
 Disability
9
 
 
4.2 Across the period 2006-7 to 2010-11, there had been a 26 per cent fall in the number of 
racially or religiously aggravated offences in England and Wales.
10
 Nonetheless, for the calendar year 
2011, total recorded hate crime from police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, still stood 
at an alarming 44,361 incidents, of which 35,875 were recorded as race hate crimes, and 1,773 were 
recorded as religious hate crimes.
11
 According to preliminary research carried out by Faith Matters, as 
of early 2012 only 3 police forces out of a total of 43 collated information about Islamophobic/anti-
Muslim hate crime.
12
 However, an indicative breakdown (2011) from official figures reveals that of 
those where the victim’s religion was ‘known’ (n. 1,216), 52 per cent (632) were recorded as religious 
hate crimes against Muslims (compared to 26 per cent against people of Jewish faith; and 14 per cent 
against people of Christian faith).
13
 When it comes to religious hate crime, most victims are Muslim.  
4.3 Figures provided by the CPS from the year 2011-12 reveal that the majority of defendants in 
both racist and religiously motivated hate crimes are men (83 per cent), White British (73.6 per cent), 
and aged 25-59 (54.2 per cent). Of the principal offence category for racial and religious hate crime, 
49.6 per cent involved offences against the person, and 32.5 per cent involved various public order 
                                            
9
 It was reported in April 2013 that Greater Manchester police had become the first police force to add 
‘Alternative Subcultures’ to the monitored list of hate crime strands. 
 
10
 See Ministry of Justice, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System, 2010 (October 2011), 
p. 33.  
11
 Total of recorded hate crime from police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland during 
calendar year 2011, available online at http://www.report 
it.org.uk/files/final_acpo_hate_crime_data_2011_(revised_oct_2011)_1.pdf 
 
12
 The Metropolitan police, City of London police, and Greater Manchester police.  
13
 Indicative Breakdown of Police Recorded Religious Hate Crimes in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, 2011, available online at http://report-
it.org.uk/files/religious_hate_crime_data_2011_published_(june_2013).pdf 
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offences.
14
 The primary sites of (official) reported hate crimes are most often public spaces (parks, 
streets, footpaths) although there is an increased probability of faith-based hate crime occurring in the 
vicinity of religious/community buildings.
15
   
4.4 Official figures do need to be approached with caution. For one, there is the perennial 
problem of under-reporting. In the first place, hate crime is not well understood by the public (for 
example, a victim might be unaware that they have been the victim of hate crime). Moreover, 
evidence from the British Crime Survey (2009/10; 2010/11) suggests that over 50 per cent of hate 
crime incidents go unreported, and therefore the majority of victims will suffer in silence.
16
 Before 
deciding whether to report an incident, victims typically undertake a cost/benefit analysis. The 
seriousness of the crime is a major factor in this decision process.
17
 Incidents often go unreported due 
to a lack of confidence in the police; because the victim was unaware that the police would be 
interested; or because incidents happen too frequently to report one specific incident.  Local 
campaigns have resulted in increased reporting in some areas. However, to improve reporting more 
generally greater trust between the police and vulnerable communities is imperative.
18
  
4.5 Compared to other minorities vulnerable to hate crime, Muslims are treated differently. While 
LGBT communities, for instance, are portrayed in police discourse as vulnerable to hate crime, and 
policy is focused on building trust with these communities, Muslims are not generally portrayed in 
such a straightforward manner.
19
 Although they are seen as vulnerable to hate crime, the primary 
focus has been on their vulnerability to extremism or radicalisation. The police, therefore, face a 
dilemma: should they adopt ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ engagement strategies in dealing with Muslim 
communities? ‘Hard’ strategies target intelligence gathering, utilising community surveillance and 
informants, while ‘soft’ strategies prioritise trust building and community policing. Under PREVENT, 
the policing of Muslim communities has tended to construct Muslim communities as ‘suspect 
populations’. This has reinforced the impression that Muslims are viewed by the authorities as 
potential terrorists or terrorist sympathisers leading to their reluctance to report anti-Muslim hate 
incidents to the police.  
                                            
14
 See Crown Prosecution Service, Hate Crimes and Crimes Against Older People Report 2011-12 
(October 2012), pp. 15-16. 
 
15
 Nicole Asquith, ‘Verbal and textual hostility’, in Neil Chakraborti (ed.) Hate Crime: Concepts, Policy, 
Future Directions (Uffculme: Willan Publishing, 2010), p. 107.  
16
 See ‘Hate Crime, cyber-security and the experience of crime among children’, p. 20.  
17
 Kris Christmann and Kevin Wong, ‘Hate crime victims and hate crime reporting: some impertinent 
questions’, in Chakraborti (ed.) Hate Crime, p. 169 & pp. 204-5. 
18
 Christmann & Wong, ‘Hate crime victims and hate crime reporting: some impertinent questions’,  p. 
205. 
 
19
 See Derek McGhee, ‘From hate to “Prevent”: community safety and counter-terrorism’, in 
Chakraborti (ed.) Hate Crime, pp. 162-193.  
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4.6 When anti-Muslim hate crime is reported, in some cases it will not have been possible to 
establish anti-Muslim hatred, or religious hatred may have been ignored in favour of establishing 
racial motivation (the most common category of hate crime) given that, in practice, the two can 
overlap. This further underscores the need for third-party reporting as a way of collecting more 
accurate data.  
4.7 Muslims constitute the second largest religious group in England and Wales with 2.7 million 
people (4.8 per cent of population). Most of Britain’s Muslims reside in London (1.13 million) and 
Muslims comprise 12.4 per cent of London’s residents (35 per cent in Tower Hamlets).
20
 Whilst 
research from the Institute of Race Relations
21
 demonstrates that race hate crime is no longer 
confined to major urban centres - the geography of hate is shifting to more small town or even rural 
contexts - London still remains Britain’s ‘capital of hate crime’:
22
 in 2011 it accounted for around 22 
per cent of race hate crime, and around 35 per cent of religious hate crime.
23
 Metropolitan police 
figures recorded 333 anti-Muslim incidents in 2010/11; and 337 incidents during 2012.
24
 More recent 
figures suggest that for the year end May 2013, there had been a +147.5 per cent increase in anti-
Muslim hate crime in the capital.
25
 London, having the largest population, still dominates the picture 
but it is worth noting that both Leicestershire and Greater Manchester witnessed higher rates of hate 
crime per 1,000 crimes committed. 
4.8  As for victimisation rates, regrettably official data on ethnicity remains patchy and incomplete. 
Nonetheless, from previous research on hate crime in London, it would seem that Asians (people 
from the Indian sub-continent) experience the highest mean rate of victimisation.
26
 Moreover, close to 
                                            
20
 See Office for National Statistics, News Release: Census gives insights into characteristics of 
London’s population, 11 December 2012. 
21
 See Jon Burnett, Racial Violence: Facing Reality (London: Institute of Race Relations, 2013). 
22
 Paul Iganski, Hate Crime and the City (Bristol: Policy Press, 2008), p. 47. 
23
 Total of recorded hate crime from police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland during 
calendar year 2011. 
24
 Sunday Telegraph, 1 June 2013. 
 
25
 See http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/textonly_month.htm. These figures relate to statutorily 
notifiable offences only and reveal an increase from 40 (May 2011-May 2012) to 99 (May 2012-May 
2013).   
26
 See Iganski, Hate Crime and the City, p 49. 
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one-third of hate crime victims in 2010/11 had been victimised more than once in the previous year.
27
 
Low-level hate crime can escalate if not dealt with quickly and effectively.
28
  
4.9 As the authors of a University of Exeter report on anti-Muslim hate crime have already noted, 
the menace of harassment, intimidation and violence against individuals forms just one dimension to 
anti-Muslim hate crime. They suggest that since 9/11, between 40 and 60 per cent of mosques, 
Islamic centres, and Muslim organisations have experienced at least one form of attack that could 
have been reported as hate crime. They estimate that a figure of between 100 and 200 hate crimes a 
year against mosques, Islamic centres and Muslim organisations ‘is not unreasonable and probably 
highly conservative’.
29
   
4.10 Another dimension to anti-Muslim hate crime - one that has become increasingly common in 
recent years - occurs online.
30
 This ‘cyberhate’ typically involves cases of harassment, abuse, and 
incitement on social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, bebo, MySpace), blogs, chat rooms, and so 
on. The online domain remains under-researched, despite the fact that around eight of ten adults 
engage in some form of internet activity every day, or almost every day. Significantly, since the mid-
1990s the far right has become increasingly drawn to online spaces. The English Defence League 
(EDL), in particular, views online activity as central to its organisational identity. Facebook is the 
favoured mode of communication between EDL supporters.
31
 Such is the growth of ‘online hate’ that a 
2009 compendium of web-hate sites, games, and chat rooms ran to more than 160 pages.
32
    
 
                                            
27
 ‘Hate Crime, cyber-security and the experience of crime among children’, p. 20. 
 
28
 See HM Government, Challenge it, Report it, Stop it – The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate 
Crime, March 2012, p. 7. 
29
 Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazier, Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: UK 
Case Studies (University of Exeter: European Muslim Research Centre, 2011), p. 106. 
 
30
 This has been recognised by ACPO which offers victims the following guidance: 1.Report it to 
website administrator. 2. Report it to the hosting company 3. Report illegal Internet material to the 
police (illegal material could be in words, pictures, videos, and even music and could include 
messages calling for racial or religious violence; web pages with pictures, videos or descriptions that 
glorify violence against anyone due to their race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or because 
they are transgender; and chat forums where people ask other people to commit hate crimes). 
 
31
 For an overview of the far right and its early adoption of the internet technology, see Nigel Copsey, 
‘Extremism on the net: The extreme right and the value of the Internet’, in Rachel Gibson, Paul Nixon 
and Stephen Ward (eds) Political Parties and the Internet: Net Gain (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 
218-233. For more recent developments, see Paul Jackson and Gerry Gable (eds) Far-Right.Com: 
Nationalist Extremism on the Internet (Searchlight/RNM Publications, 2011). 
 
32
 See Raymond A. Franklin, The Hate Directory (15 February 2009, release 13.1). 
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5. Perpetrators: Hate Crime and the Far Right  
5.1 In the British context, traditional approaches have downplayed the relationship between hate 
crime and the far right. Thus, for Christopher T. Husbands: 
When one considers how well-known it is that such crimes are under-reported and/or under-
recorded, it is self-evident in the British context that there are just not enough extreme-right 
activists to be committing them: Instead, there is a wider penumbra of hate-crime 
perpetrators, outside formal mobilization by the extreme right.
33
   
For Husbands, it is obvious that ‘such crimes are committed by a far wider stratum of the population 
than those active, or even particularly sympathetic to, the extreme right’.
34
  
5.2  Organised far-right extremists are, according to standard accounts, responsible for only a 
very small proportion of hate crime in Britain. Research on racial violence in 2009, undertaken by the 
Institute of Race Relations, reveals that just 24 of the perpetrators in 660 cases belonged to a far-right 
party or used fascist symbols.
35
 Forget the popular stereotype of the shaven-headed extremist, most 
perpetrators of racial violence, it seems, are characterised by their very ordinariness.
 36
 
5.3 Such accounts are, however, shaped by a conventional reading of the situational context of 
‘everyday’ hate crime, that is, crimes that take place offline, on the street or in the home, are often 
random and/or opportunistic, involving general abuse, harassment, assault, and damage to 
property/vandalism.  Much less attention has been paid to online hate crime, which can be the 
precursor to more physically threatening offline incidents. Moreover, when far-right activists do commit 
hate crime offences, there is some evidence to suggest that ‘the incident may be more premeditated 
and extreme than those perpetrated by “ordinary” members of the public’.
37
 Here, one might make 
reference to Soho nail bomber, and former British National Party (BNP) member, David Copeland as 
one of the more obvious examples. Yet there are others who were caught before they could wreak 
havoc (such as Neil Lewington who used his bedroom as a bomb-making factory).
38
  
                                            
33
 See Christopher T. Husbands, ‘Country Report Great Britain’, in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.) 
Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in Europe (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2009), p. 264. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 See Racial Violence: The Buried Issue, by Harmit Athwal, Jenny Bourne, and Rebecca Wood, 
Institute of Race Relations Briefing Paper No. 6, 2010.  
36
 See Iganski, Hate Crime and the City, p. 42. 
37
 Charraborti & Garland, Hate Crime, p. 138. 
 
38
 See ‘Man “on cusp” of bombing campaign’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8124449.stm. 
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5.4 Of course it goes without saying that post 9/11, and especially post 7/7 the Muslim community 
has been singled out for vitriolic attack by the far right.
39
 Britain’s most successful electoral far-right 
party, the British National Party, has initiated numerous campaigns against Britain’s Muslim 
communities. In the wake of 9/11, the BNP widely distributed a leaflet entitled ‘The Truth about 
I.S.L.A.M’ with I.S.L.A.M supposedly an acronym for ‘Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson and 
Moletastation of women’. In 2004 Nick Griffin described Islam as ‘an evil, wicked faith’. Following the 
7/7 London bombings the BNP distributed a leaflet that carried an aerial photograph of the bus 
ravaged by one of the London bombs, along with the slogan ‘maybe now its time to start listening to 
the BNP’. There have been various BNP campaigns against ‘grooming’ by ‘Muslim paedophile’ gangs; 
the BNP has also alleged that British Muslims (Pakistanis in particular) are responsible for the heroin 
trade.  
5.5  The English Defence League - originally formed in 2009 – has been the other major far-right 
anti-Muslim protagonist. The EDL is a deeply Islamophobic
40
 new social movement that has 
prioritised street-based activity, having organised countless demonstrations across England over 
recent years, many leading to confrontational violence (despite its disingenuous claim to be peacefully 
protesting against militant Islam). The EDL, as its ‘Mission Statement’ reveals, is defined by its open 
hostility to Islam (and not just militant Islam). The EDL insists that radical Islam has a ‘stranglehold on 
British Muslims’ and calls for an ‘Islamic reformation’ whereby Muslims have the right to demand 
reform of their own religion; it maintains that Sharia law is incompatible with democratic principles; it 
understoods Islam as a totalitarian ‘political and social ideology’ (blurring the distinction between 
mainstream and militant Islam); and it calls for a defence of English culture against policy-makers who 
‘deliberately undermine our culture and impose non-English cultures on the English people in their 
own land’. If, as the EDL claim, other ‘foreign’ cultures can integrate and adapt, Islam (and not just its 
militant form) is in fundamental conflict with ‘Englishness’. The ‘English Muslim’ becomes an 
impossible identity. The final point in the EDL’s Mission Statement commits the EDL to a broader 
international struggle against ‘Islamic intolerance’. Drawing upon the cultural ‘clash of civilisations’ 
                                            
 
39
 It should be pointed out that before the 9/11 attacks, the BNP had already been increasingly 
targeting Islam and Muslims.  
40
 According to the 1997 Runnymede definition, Islamophobia is said to be comprised of eight 
components 1) Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change; 2) Islam is seen 
as separate and ‘other’. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by 
them and does not influence them; 3) Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, 
irrational, primitive and sexist; 4) Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of 
terrorism and engaged in a 'clash of civilisations'; 5) Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used 
for political or military advantage; 6) Criticisms made of the West by Islam are rejected out of hand; 7) 
Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of 
Muslims from mainstream society; 8) Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal.                           
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thesis, the vast expanse and complexity of the modern world is reduced to a crude and simple ‘us’ 
(the West) against ‘them’ (Muslims).
41
   
5.6 Many of the English Defence League’s views on Islam do replicate those of the BNP but the 
EDL insists that it stands opposed to the BNP, and to other traditional far-right organisations. The 
EDL endeavours to style itself as pro-Israeli, pro-liberal, multi-faith/ethnic and sometimes even ‘multi-
cultural’ (which has led to some uncertainty over whether the organisation should be labelled ‘far 
right’). In fact, rather than support the BNP, the EDL leadership recently endorsed the ‘libertarian’ 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which under its former leader, Lord Pearson, adopted 
an openly critical stance towards Islam. Responding to the EDL’s endorsement, a UKIP spokesman 
declared that ‘if you are an EDL supporter then you are not welcome in UKIP’.
42
 UKIP does ban EDL 
‘members’ (and former BNP members) from joining the party. An obvious issue here is that the EDL is 
a ‘non-membership’ organisation (its ‘supporters’ sign up online through Facebook).
43
 Although UKIP 
distances itself from the far right, its position reveals the growing receptivity to anti-Muslim and 
xenophobic attitudes amongst the right-wing of mainstream politics. 
5.7  UKIP has appropriated some obvious far-right themes (opposition to immigration; 
‘Islamification’; multiculturalism; anti-EU); it also draws (increasingly) from the same reservoirs of 
public support as the BNP/EDL.
44
 But UKIP is rarely included in classifications of the far right (and it is 
not classified as far right in this report). The reporting approach adopted by Tell MAMA means that 
identification of the perpetrator(s) link with the far right is, in the first instance, dependent on the 
victim’s perception. In the case of offline attacks, this would typically relate to verbal comments made 
by the perpetrator(s) such as ‘No Surrender!’ or ‘NFSE’ (‘No Fucking Surrender Ever’), which are 
favoured sayings of EDL supporters; and/or identification on the clothing of perpetrator(s) (such as an 
EDL badge, for example). In the case of online attacks, Tell MAMA caseworkers seek verification of 
outward expressions of support for the far right/or far-right organisations on social media sites. It is 
also worth noting that where no specific link is made by the victim, this does not mean that the 
perpetrator is not associated with the far right, merely that the victim did not recognise such a link. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
41
 See http://englishdefenceleague.org/mission-statement 
42
 See http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/453603/20130404/edl-ukip-elections.htm 
43
 Its main Facebook page had 140,000 ‘likes’ as of 11 June 2013. 
 
44
 See for example, Jon Cruddas et al., The Far Right in London: A Challenge for Local Democracy 
(York: Joseph Rowntree Trust, 2005); Matthew Goodwin and Jocelyn Evans, From Voting to 
Violence? Far Right Extremism in Britain (London: Hope not Hate/Searchlight Educational Trust). 
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6.  Tell MAMA Dataset Results 
 
6.1 The data collected reveals that in the period examined – 1 April 2012 to 30 April 2013 
inclusive – there were 584 recorded incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime. As we have seen, hate 
crime, particularly against Muslims, is under-reported. Indeed, the Tell MAMA project was developed 
with the specific intention of overcoming the unwillingness of many in Muslim communities to report 
incidents to the police. The data collected reveals that 37 per cent of those who reported cases to Tell 
MAMA had already reported the incident to the police. In 63 per cent of cases (almost 2 in every 3) 
victims did not report the incident to the police. As this suggests, the problem of under-reporting 
remains a significant challenge. 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Whilst in no sense can the Tell MAMA dataset be taken as definitive of any national trends, 
the statistical evidence that it does offer is more representative then previously available data. 
Academic Chris Allen, for instance, has downplayed the significance of previous datasets collected by 
the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) and the Forum against Islamophobia and Racism 
(FAIR) on the grounds that they were London based and, therefore, not representative of England (let 
alone the rest of the UK). Allen was also unconvinced by the definition of Islamophobia used in 
categorising incidents and, for both these reasons, he regarded the evidence gathered as more 
indicative than conclusive.
45
 As mentioned earlier, the definition of anti-Muslim hate crime utilised in 
this report sits within the category of religious hate crime (as used by ACPO, the CPS and other 
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 Chris Allen, Islamophobia (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 124. 
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practitioners). Accordingly, this report has refrained from using the terms ‘Islamophobic incidents’ or 
‘Islamophobic hate crime’.  
 
6.3 In relation to the location of offline incidents (n. 150), more reported incidents - 44 per cent - 
took place in the London area than in any other single location. However, a significant number of 
reported incidents occurred in the Midlands (21 per cent), and Southern England (excluding London), 
10 per cent. Yorkshire and Lancashire each contributed 8 per cent to the overall incident rate. The 
data can, therefore, be regarded as more geographically representative than previous London-based 
studies. 
 
 
6.3 Furthermore, the data suggests that online expressions of anti-Muslim sentiment have 
reached significant proportions, with 74 per cent of incidents reported to Tell MAMA taking place 
online compared to 26 per cent being committed in the physical world.  
 
 
 
 
6.4 Of reported attacks committed offline, 1 in every 2 involved incidents of abusive behaviour. 
The occurrences of assaults, threats, and property damage are less frequent and fairly similar in 
number, with assault and property damage each taking place in 12 per cent of cases and threats 
being made in 11 per cent. The dissemination of anti-Muslim literature occurred in 11 per cent of 
cases. Significantly, only 8 per cent of incidents were described as involving ‘extreme violence’.  
Online, 434 
Offline, 150 
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS 
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6.5 Reported incidents of verbal abuse included direct insults and offensive comments either on 
the streets, in the workplace, in or near mosques, or around people’s neighbourhoods. The insults 
deployed include references to ‘Pakis’; rape; paedophiles; inbreeding; incest; jihad; terrorists; bombs; 
filth; ‘muzzrats’; and various animals including dogs; pigs; goats; and baboons. However, openly 
racist language is recorded as a feature of only a minority (12 per cent) of incidents (in official 
statistics racist motivation is reported as occurring more frequently).  
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6.6. The reported offline incidents that took place were mainly street based – 55 per cent - with 18 
per cent taking place at mosques and other Islamic institutions and 13 per cent at workplaces and 
schools. Among this latter category the dataset records several instances of bullying at school and in 
the workplace continuing over a period of time and which the victims found very distressing.
46
 The 
majority of incidents involving mosques were described by respondents as damage or desecration. 
These incidents ranged from the placing of a pig’s head; graffiti; damage to the Koran; broken 
windows; and a bomb hoax through to one verified case of arson. The remaining incidents were 
abusive behaviour and the distribution of anti-Muslim literature.
47
 A typical example of the latter is the 
following snapshot: 
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 Main database ref. 288 and supplementary database (1) refs. 33 & 49. 
47
 For example, main database refs 92, 109, 251, 282, 295, 296, &  352. Supplementary database (1) 
Refs 5 & 41. Supplementary database (2) refs. 298, 303, 388, & 398.  
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‘Last week we had a car drive past Lea Bridge 
Road Mosque with the individuals tearing out 
pages of the Quran.’ 
 
Ref. 398 
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Of the reported offline offences the majority of victims were female and, of these, over 80 per cent 
were women who were easily identifiable as Muslim, i.e. wearing the hijab or niqab. 
 
 
 
 
In one reported incident the victim had only recently started wearing the hijab: 
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In the cases with male victims, over 70 per cent were not wearing clothing identifiable as Muslim. 
 
 
 
 
6.7 The offline incidents reported to Tell MAMA are overwhelmingly committed by males aged 40 
or younger.  
 
Not Wearing 
Muslim Clothing 
59% 
Wearing Muslim 
Clothing 
41% 
IDENTIFIABILITY OF VICTIMS 
‘for the past 6 months when i have started to wear a hijab i have 
been getting people pushing me on the floor and being very rude to 
me on the bus or trying to take off my hijab and calling me a 
terrorist. 3 weeks ago i was walking to the mosque to pray Maghrib 
and i had 2 black boys push me to the floor and then 2 white boys 
came from behind me and spit on me , they told me that im a paki 
and they wish that all muslims were dead. the most thing that broke 
my heart and made me cry is when i walked away and they said the 
most horrible things about allah.’ 
 
Ref 358 
 
20 
 
 
 
Most offline incidents were recorded as being perpetrated by people in their late teens, twenties and 
thirties (the difficulty of reliably identifying attacker demographics online precluded the use of age-
related indicators in our analysis of online attacks). 
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7.0 Links to the Far Right 
 
7.1 The majority of offline incidents do not have any reported link to the far right. Nonetheless 
nearly 1 in 4 of offline cases did report a perceived link to the far right – a link identified and reported 
by the victim. Of the 29 incidents that reported a link to the far right, 11 were associated with the EDL; 
5 with the BNP; and 1 with the National Front. 
 
 
 
 
7.2 A significant finding here is that the far right is more clearly associated with the majority of 
online cases. The majority of the incidents of Muslim hate crime reported to Tell MAMA are online 
incidents and 300 – 69 per cent - of these online cases reported a link to the far right. Clearly, the far 
right is utilising the Internet to disseminate its anti-Muslim vitriol more widely and more effectively. 
This finding is endorsed by the emerging secondary literature, which, while lacking significant 
empirical evidence, also suggests that the far right are increasingly developing their online presence. 
In the USA online anti-Muslim activity tends to focus around high profile right-wing figures such as 
Pamela Geller, Robert Spencer, Daniel Pipes or Martin Kramer.
48
 The Tell MAMA data records no 
incidents involving similar well-known British figures. To date, for instance, the EDL’s ‘Tommy 
Robinson’ is the most prominent individual reported to Tell MAMA for online hate crime. In one 
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instance Robinson was reported for a tweet allegedly contemplating the gang rape of Muslim 
women.
49
 
 
 
 
 
7.3 The English Defence League is the far-right organisation most active on the Internet in terms 
of disseminating anti-Muslim sentiments. EDL supporters/sympathisers have been identified in 147 of 
these cases, the CXF (Combined Ex-Forces)
50
 five, the JDL (Jewish Defence League)
51
 four, and the 
BNP just two. Although both the EDL and the BNP deploy anti-Muslim propaganda in their 
campaigns, the volume of reported online anti-Muslim hate crime incidents linked specifically to the 
EDL suggests that it is the English Defence League (and not the BNP) which is most visibly making 
its online presence felt in terms of anti-Muslim attacks. As of March 2013, Tell MAMA’s work had led 
to the arrests of 21 EDL supporters.
52
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 Main database, ref 637. 
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 Originally formed in 2011, the Combined Ex-Forces is a small EDL splinter group. 
51
 The Jewish Defence League is an offshoot of the EDL’s Jewish Division and is believed to be run 
by Roberta Moore. 
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 See http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/fiyaz-mughal/islamophobia-anti-muslim-
hatred_b_2853468.html 
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7.4 Women were responsible for 78 - 18 per cent - of the online incidents reported.  Of these 
cases, 18 reported a link with the EDL. In seven cases these women were allegedly advocating offline 
violence against Muslims including burning Muslims, killing Muslim babies, blowing up mosques and 
smearing buildings associated with Muslims with dog faeces. The religiously offensive comments 
recorded included references to Mohammed as a paedophile and Satan’s prophet, Islam being a cult, 
and insulting remarks about the Koran. Racist remarks were, in turn, mainly anti-Pakistani comments 
and references to dirt and filth. More generally there were comments accusing Muslims of rape; 
paedophilia; incest; interbreeding; being terrorists; and killing Jews.  
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7.5 Significantly the dataset reveals that the majority of perpetrators of reported online incidents 
make some kind of threat of offline action. Comments made by those recording the incidents indicate 
that, over time, repeat offenders become increasingly aggressive.
53
 Insults are very similar to those 
deployed in street and mosque-based incidents but the threats can be very intimidating, even 
extending to the prospect of the perpetrator coming to the victim’s house and killing their children. 
Further research is urgently needed to qualify the frequency of cases where online hate is the 
precursor to real-life incidents.   
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 An example of this is the extremely unpleasant remarks made by ‘Guru Marc’, see main database 
refs 572, 599, 617 and supplementary database (2), ref 243. 
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7.6 Snapshot examples of EDL-linked online comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threatened Offline 
Action 
65% 
No Threat to Offline 
Action 
35% 
ONLINE THREATS OF DIRECT 
ACTION 
Just pour pigs blood in 
every reservoir in Britain, 
the whole land will be 
tainted, good bye 
muzzrats!’ 
 
EDL Yorkshire 
Ref. 308 
 
‘Have you seen the price of 
meat? And Muslim babies are 
so plentiful! Sharia allows 
sodomising babies! #EDL’ 
Ref. 370 
 
‘you can lead a muslim to 
culture but you can't make him 
think #edl’  
 
EDL sympathiser 
Ref. 302 
 
@fifteenheretics ‘Sadly, 
Britain is full of these filthy 
Muslim immigrants. 
Someone should 'teach 
him a lesson' and cut his 
head off #edl’ 
 
EDL sympathiser 
Ref. 243 
 
@EDLTrobinson @TellMamaUK  
‘If u have a lecherous fool for a 
prophet and consider him a 
perfect man then u will be 
mocked, full stop.’ 
 
Ref. 377 
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‘There is no such thing as 
a moderate Muslim.They 
are all nutjobs  
Because they are 
animals.’ 
 
‘Tommy Robinson’ 
Ref. 313 
 
‘Hope your mosque has fire 
insurance Muslim immigrant 
cunt. Fried halal.’• 
‘You raped British women and 
children. Now you can pay.’ 
EDL• 
Ref. 293 
 
‘Pakistan factory fires kill 
at least 261 …SUCH A 
SHAME LOOOOOOOL 
 
French mosque smeared 
with excrement in new 
vandalism on Muslim 
places of worship … 
Loooool love it!!’ 
 
EDL Birmingham 
Ref. 365 
 
‘islam is not a religion its a child 
molesting cult … 
@MoAnsar@TellMamaUK 
he needs to be deported out of a 
cannon … please fuck off back 
to your cave you paedo’ 
 
Infidels of Britain 
Ref. 378 
 
‘face it cunt Muhammad had sex 
with Aysha wen she was 9 that's 
pedo’  
 
EDL 
Ref. 391 
 
‘…we don't marry our dad like you 
dirty muzrats’ 
 
EDL supporter  
Ref. 389 
 
The following comment has 
been directed against 
Mohamed Ansar on 
twitter…  
‘You fucking disgrace go 
and hang yourself with 
your beard and I will come 
 round and shove bacon in 
your scummy shit cunt 
mouth EDL!!!’ 
 
EDL supporter Ref. 392 
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8.0 Key Findings 
 
 Reluctance to report incidents to the police remains a significant problem; 
 Offline incidents that were reported were mainly street based (55 per cent) with 18 per cent 
taking place at mosques and other Islamic institutions and 13 per cent at workplaces and 
schools; 
 1 in every 2 reported offline attacks involved low-level abuse and harassment, with less than 
10 per cent involving extreme violence; 
 Of the reported offline offences the majority of victims were female and, of these, over 80 per 
cent were women who were easily identifiable as Muslim, i.e. wearing the hijab or niqab; 
 Most offline perpetrators were reported as male (78 per cent) and under the age of forty; 
 The majority of reported offline incidents were not linked to the far right, but a far right link was 
nonetheless reported in almost 1 in every 4 offline cases; 
 Most reported anti-Muslim hate crime incidents occurred online (74 per cent); 
 The majority of reported online cases did include threats of offline action and therefore should 
not be dismissed or underestimated; 
 Most perpetrators of online anti-Muslim hate crime were reported as male; 
 Nearly 70 per cent of online incidents reported a link to the far right; 
 Of the online incidents that reported a link to the far right, it is the EDL, rather than the BNP, 
that was specifically named in 49 per cent of such cases. The English Defence League is the 
far-right organisation that is most implicated in disseminating anti-Muslim hate online. 
 The overall link to the far right reported by victims stood at 56 per cent for the period 1 April 
2012 to 30 April 2013 - 300 online incidents reported a link to the far right; 29 offline cases 
reported such a link. 
 
 
9.0 Post-Woolwich Addendum 
 
9.1 This report was unable to investigate attack chronology since any spikes shown in the data 
might only reflect a change in the numbers of people aware of the Tell MAMA service. 
However, the response to the horrific murder of soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich on 22 May 
2013 does allow researchers to isolate cause and effect, quantifying any increase in anti-
Muslim hate incidents. In the wake of the 7/7 bombings, for instance, the Metropolitan police 
reported a sharp but temporary increase in the level of anti-Muslim hate crime incidents. By 
the end of August 2005 the level of incidents had fallen back to the number of incidents that 
were being recorded prior to the bombings.
54
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9.2 The baseline of reported hate crime for the period under our study (April 2012 to April 2013 
inclusive) was an average of 1.5 incidents per day. Below are the verified figures recorded by 
Tell MAMA for the period 22 May to 25 June (inclusive). The figures reveal a total of 241 
reported incidents across a 35 day period – an average baseline figure of 6 to 7 reported 
incidents per day:   
 
 22-27th May 28-3
rd
 June 4-10
th
 June  11-17
th
 June 18-25
th
 June 
No of 
incidents 
110 40 29 26 36 
      
 
 
9.3 Reported incidents ranged from general verbal abuse targeted at visible Muslim females 
through to incendiary devices thrown against a number of mosques (although in keeping with 
the findings here, less than one in 12 cases reported to Tell MAMA involved the physical 
targeting of individuals, such as the throwing of objects and/or attempts to forcibly remove 
Islamic clothing). On 10 June 2013, Metropolitan Police Commander Simon Letchford told the 
Radio 4 Today programme that recorded attacks against Muslims in London had increased 
eightfold following the Woolwich murder (increasing sharply from one incident per day to 
around eight per day). ACPO announced that it had received 136 complaints of anti-Muslim 
hate incidents in the week following Lee Rigby’s murder. These were reported directly to 
ACPO via its True Vision site for hate crimes, and included physical offences and internet 
material. However, ACPO also revealed a fall from 136 to 37 reported incidents in the period 
between 29 May and 4 June.
55
 
 
9.4 Further research is now urgently required in order to establish whether baseline figures return 
to ‘normal’ (the experience after 7/7 suggests that this will probably be the case assuming the 
absence of further precipitating incidents). Any lasting increase in baseline rates could 
indicate that the Woolwich incident has had a significant cumulative effect upon anti-Muslim 
hate crime over the longer term. 
 
9.5  As for final reflections, there remains an obvious danger of overstating the incidence and 
proliferation of anti-Muslim hate crime. On the whole British society remains open and 
tolerant. Tellingly, a YouGov survey from October 2012 revealed that just 3 per cent identified 
‘Muslims in Britain’ as the single most important issue facing the country, and just 3 per cent 
agreed with both the values and methods of the English Defence League. On the other hand, 
the survey data also revealed that 21 per cent agreed with the values of the EDL (if not their 
methods); that 49 per cent agreed that there would be a ‘clash of civilisations’ between 
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Muslims and native white Britons; and that 54 per cent agreed that relationships between 
Britain’s different ethnic, racial or religious groups would get worse.
56
  
 
9.6 The contextual causes of popular anti-Muslim sentiment remain subject to on-going debate. 
The 9/11 and 7/7 attacks; counter-terrorism policy; demonisation of Muslims by the 
mainstream media (and by sections of the political mainstream); the demise of traditional 
national identities; concerns over multiculturalism; globalisation (and others); have all been 
cited as important factors. Anti-Muslim hate crime is one manifestation of this anti-Muslim 
sentiment, and it would be wrong to dismiss its significance (or even subject it to relativism, 
that is to say, compare it with cases of Jihadi extremism). The bottom line is that anti-Muslim 
hate crime can have a corrosive impact upon individual well-being, upon families, upon 
communities, and ultimately upon social cohesion. 
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 See http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/h8vxb8d4l3/YG-Archive-221012-EDL-
Toplines.pdf.  
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